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ABSTRACT
There is vast literature on the influence of nonstate actors (NSAs) on intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). 
Successful cases have been documented in which transnational advocacy networks (TANs) use the platforms 
provided by intergovernmental organizations for their own participation in treaty making, agenda-setting, policy 
formation and implementation, and to change repressive and norm-violating states’ behavior. However, little 
has been said about IGOs engaging NSAs to influence their own member states’ preferences.  This paper uses 
the case of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the United 
States on the eve of Palestine’s admission as a member state of the U.N. agency as an illustration of the need 
for IGOs to implement public diplomacy strategies as a means of influencing member states’ decisions. Using 
Keck and Sikkink’s “boomerang pattern,” this paper demonstrates how the pattern, classically associated with 
TANs, can be used by UNESCO to influence U.S. domestic politics and regain its funding. It concludes that public 
diplomacy can be a means for UNESCO to tackle two important challenges: the lack of public awareness about 
the organization and the negative perceptions from both publics and elites. 
INTRODUCTION
There is vast literature on the influence of nonstate actors (NSAs) on intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). 
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) engage with states at a domestic and transnational level to engage 
their home governments and other states in international issue areas1 or to seek representation within IGOs to 
affect state practices.2
Successful cases have been documented in which transnational advocacy networks (TANs) use the platforms 
provided by intergovernmental organizations for their own participation in treaty making;3 agenda-setting, policy 
1	 	Shamima	Ahmed	and	David	Potter,	NGOs in International Politics,	(Bloomfield:	Kumarian	Press,	2006):	58.
2	 	Richard	Langhorne,	“The	Diplomacy	of	Non-State	Actors,”	Diplomacy & Statecraft 16,	no.2	(2005):	331–339.
3	 	Thomas	Risse,	“The	Power	of	Norms	Versus	The	Norms	of	Power,”	in	The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil 
Society,	ed.		Ann	Florini.	(Washington	D.C:	Carnegie	Endowment	for	International	Peace,	2000).
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formation and implementation4 or to change repressive and norm-violating states’ behavior.5 In a similar vein, 
it has been argued that the use of naming and shaming campaigns by states and NSAs has resulted in “mixed 
coalitions of governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental actors that try to influence publics and 
governments through public diplomacy.”6 However, little has been said about IGOs engaging NSAs to influence 
their own member states’ preferences.
It might seem antagonistic for IGOs to leverage the support of NSAs to influence member states’ behavior. 
IGOs are responsible first to the nation-states that have created them. They tend to be conformist and status-
quo oriented, as they look to their member states before creating policy.7 However, IGOs need to accommodate 
member states’ preferences to ensure that funds for their operations remain a priority. Particularly for international 
development-oriented IGOs, such as some of the U.N. agencies, ensuring that member states continue to 
contribute is vital for adequate aid-delivering capacity. 
In spite of the declining numbers of their financial contributions, developed nations still contribute the largest 
share of the total funding for the U.N.’s operational activities in development.8 However, states make rational 
choices regarding whether to allocate their resources through multilateral or bilateral aid. They deliberate on the 
basic tension between “the desire for control and accountability over how resources are spent,” versus “the wider 
benefits of pooling resources, presence, and expertise” provided by multilateral organizations.9 U.N. agencies 
know how hard they have to press to maintain the flow of state contributions for aid through international rather 
than bilateral channels.10
The case of the relationship between the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) and the United States on the eve of Palestine’s admission as a member state of the U.N. agency 
illustrates the urgency of an IGO to secure funding by influencing a member state. Additionally, it serves as a 
case study to analyze the need for IGOs to implement public diplomacy strategies as a means of influencing 
member states’ decisions. As the U.S. was forced to withhold its contributions – 22 percent of the IGO’s budget 
– due to legislative restrictions aimed at halting Palestine’s efforts for statehood recognition via the U.N. system, 
UNESCO had to approach American NSAs to help raise awareness about UNESCO’s mission and restore 
financial contributions from the U.S. 
Theoretical frameworks on the impact of NGOs in world politics can be helpful to explore possible avenues 
for IGOs to affect NSAs for the purpose of influencing a member state. This paper argues that Keck and Sikkink’s 
“boomerang pattern” can be an avenue for IGOs to attempt to harness transnational networks and pressure 
member states from the outside. 
Thus, this paper fundamentally aims to answer, Can UNESCO use the boomerang pattern that characterizes 
TANs to influence U.S. domestic politics? This paper explains the boomerang pattern and adjusts it to the 
UNESCO-U.S. impasse. Then, it assesses the conditions under which UNESCO can activate transnational 
advocacy networks as well as use the networks’ persuasion tactics. Finally, the paper outlines some implications 
of UNESCO’s public diplomacy efforts in the U.S.
WHAT IS THE BOOMERANG PATTERN AND WHY CAN IT BE APPLIED TO 
THE UNESCO-U.S. IMPASSE?
In their well-cited work, Activists Beyond Borders, Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Margaret Keck 
and Kathryn Sikkink outlined the “boomerang pattern.” This model was conceived from the observations of the 
4	 	Ahmed	and	Potter,	NGOs in International Politics,	54.	
5	 	Margaret	Keck	and	Kathryn	Sikkink,	Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics,	(Ithaca:	Cornell	
University	Press,	1998).
6	 	Joseph	Nye,	The Future of Power,	(New	York:	Public	Affairs,	2008):	103.
7	 	Ahmed	and	Potter,	NGOs in International Politics,	82.	
8	 	“Analysis	of	funding	of	operational	activities	for	development	of	the	United	Nations	system	for	the	year	2010,”	
Development Cooperation Policy Branch Office for ECOSOC Support and Coordination Department of Economic and Social Affairs,”	
last	modified	May	31,	2012,		http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/2012_funding_report-figures_and_tables.pdf.
9	 	“2011	DAC	Report	on	Multilateral	Aid,”	OECD,	last	modified	2011,	http://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/49014277.pdf.
10	 		Richard	Hoggart,	An Idea and its Servants UNESCO from Within,	(London:	Chatto	&	Windus,	1978):	33.
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effects of transnational NGOs’ pressure on repressive or unresponsive states. Keck and Sikkink’s model was 
inspired by the advocacy campaigns regarding issues such as human rights, the environment, women, children, 
and indigenous rights. Consequently, they observed that, “boomerang strategies are most common in campaigns 
where the target is a state’s domestic policies or behavior.”11
Keck and Sikkink’s work sought to define the conditions that make TANs possible and the factors that trigger 
their emergence. Accordingly, setting the boomerang pattern into motion commonly requires that the channels 
between domestic groups and their governments be blocked, hampered, or ineffective for resolving a conflict.12 
Using this, it is the inability of the domestic political or judiciary arena to recognize or enable the participation of 
domestic civil society actors that makes domestic NGOs bypass their states, bringing pressure from the outside. 
This does not mean that the use of boomerang strategies can be limited to NGOs working on human 
rights issues. Although, international and domestic NGOs play a central role in all advocacy networks, parts of 
regional and international intergovernmental organizations are also considered.13 This implies that IGOs may 
use boomerang strategies to trigger transnational advocacy support for their causes in order to produce policy or 
behavioral change by a specific actor. 
The effectiveness of TANs not only depends on the actor’s capacity to throw a boomerang, but in the actual 
support it can bring to its cause. In this regard, Keck and Sikkink examine the conditions for transnational 
campaigns to affect political outcomes by: 1) identifying the resources that make a campaign possible, such as the 
set of tactics to persuade, socialize, and pressure their targets, and 2) the institutional structures that encourage or 
impede particular kinds of transnational activism. Moreover, since advocacy campaigns are “processes of issue 
construction constrained by the action context in which they are to be carried out,”14 the authors looked into the 
characteristics of the issues that networks advocate for, as well as the characteristics of the networks, and the 
“vulnerability” of the target they seek to influence. 
In order to proceed with Keck and Sikkink’s assessment, a review of the UNESCO and the U.S. impasse is 
necessary. 
The UNESCO-U.S. impasse following Palestine’s admission to UNESCO
On October 31, 2011, the 194 state members of UNESCO convened at the organization’s 189th General 
Conference in Paris to accept Palestine as a full member-state. According to UNESCO’s admission rules, states 
that seek full membership require a recommendation of UNESCO’s Executive Board15 and a two-thirds majority 
vote by the General Conference.16 UNESCO members’ support for Palestine’s admission was strong in both of its 
governing bodies, making it the first U.N. agency to admit Palestine as a full member. 
Palestine’s admission forced the U.S. to withhold its financial contributions to the U.N. agency. The U.S. 
decision obeyed two public laws that date back to 1990 and 1994. The first law prohibited the appropriation 
of funds “for the United Nations or any specialized agency thereof which accords the Palestine Liberation 
Organization the same standing as a member state.”17 The second law expanded those prohibitions by halting 
contributions to U.N. organizations that “grant full membership as a state to any organization or group that does 
not have the internationally recognized attributes of statehood.”18
The suspension of U.S. funds left UNESCO with “a serious cash-flow shortfall,” mostly because the U.S. alone 
provided 22 percent of the organization’s annual budget.19 UNESCO’s Director-General, Irina Bokova, took 
prompt action to reduce expenditures and staff costs. Despite fundraising mechanisms, the delivery capacity of 
11	 	Keck	and	Sikkink,	Activists Beyond Borders, 12.
12	 	Ibid.
13	 	Ibid.,	9.
14	 	Ibid.,	8.
15	 “UNESCO’s	Governing	Bodies,”	UNESCO,	last	modified	September	26,	2013,	http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/
about-us/who-we-are/governing-bodies/.
16	 	Ibid.
17	 	Foreign	Relations	Act,	Fiscal	Years	1990	and	1991,	Pub.L.	No.	101-246,	104	Stat.	3792	(1990).	
18	 	Foreign	Relations	Act,	Fiscal	Years	1994	and	1995,	Pub.L.	No.	103-236,	108	Stat.	2333	(1994).	
19	 	UNESCO,	191EX/26	“Financial	Situation	of	the	Organization	and	its	Implications	for	the	Implementation	of	Document,”	
March	15,	2013,	http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002200/220045e.pdf.
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UNESCO’s programs dedicated to education, sciences, culture, and communication were compromised, leaving 
UNESCO handicapped in attaining its objectives and expected results.20
While Palestine’s admission provoked concerted disapproval from the U.S. government, it spurred 
disagreements over cutting off funds to the U.N. agency. Even though the U.S. Department of State expressed the 
vote as “regrettable, premature, and undermines our shared goal of a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace 
in the Middle East,”21 the State Department retained its membership and commitment to UNESCO and showed 
its willingness to “consult with Congress to ensure that U.S. interests and influence are preserved.”22 The Obama 
administration actively sought to waive restrictions and requested funds for the fiscal year 2013 and 2014 
budgets.23 However, Congress has shown a reluctant attitude, because the funds withheld are used as a “credible 
threat”24 and justified as a means to deter Palestinian attempts for state recognition through the U.N. system.25
Nevertheless, Palestine was granted observer status in the U.N. General Assembly in 1974, and diplomatic 
maneuvers to obtain statehood recognition in the U.N. by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) began 
in 1989. These maneuvers began with attempts to upgrade its status as a state member of the World Health 
Organization and later to UNESCO.  More recently, while peace negotiations with Israel remain stalled, efforts 
by Palestinian authorities have resumed. A failed attempt to achieve full U.N. membership took place in 2011, 
but in 2012, Palestine successfully gained non-member-state status at the General Assembly.26
U.S. Congress opposition to restore U.S. contributions to UNESCO stems from its support for Israel and 
its firm conviction that Palestine must return to direct negotiations with Israel. Lawmakers have argued that 
Palestine’s admission hampers the negotiations for a viable peace with Israel. Congress has called Palestinian 
efforts to seek statehood via the U.N. “unilateral” and pressured for returning to the table of negotiations.27 
Moreover, to the detriment of UNESCO’s image, members of Congress are also frustrated by “UNESCO’s history 
of perceived anti-American leanings and disproportionate focus on Israel.”28
The boomerang pattern adjusted to the impasse
It is possible to draw some similarities between Keck and Sikkink’s examination of the conditions under which 
the boomerang strategies of transnational networks appear and the conditions surrounding the U.S.-UNESCO 
impasse. As UNESCO is interested in changing U.S. law, it is toward the legislative process that influence must 
be exerted. For UNESCO, this is not a viable option due to the legal restrictions that prohibit foreign entities 
from lobbying Congress. Additionally, Congress has been reluctant to acquiesce to UNESCO’s claims, as the 
defunding of UNESCO serves as a “credible threat” to deter Palestinian attempts for state recognition through the 
U.N. Since the political and legal conditions embedded in the U.S.-UNESCO impasse are obstructing UNESCO 
from the restoration of U.S. funds, the U.N. agency, according to the boomerang theory, may find it fruitful to 
20	 	Ibid.
21	 	United	States	Department	of	State,	“Palestinian	Admission	to	UNESCO.”	http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2011/10/176418.htm.	(accessed	May	1,	2013).
22	 	Ibid.
23	 	William	Bigelow,	“Obama	Budget	Attempts	to	Resume	UNESCO	Defunding	Over	Recognition	of	Palestine”.		Breitbart News 
Network,	April	12,	2013.	http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2013/04/12/Obama-Budget-Includes-Refunding-UNESCO-Which-
Recognizes-Palestine	(accessed	September	26,	2013).
24	 	Ileana	Ros-Lehtinen,	“As	Palestinian	Flag	Raised	at	UNESCO,	Ros-Lehtinen	Urges	Funding	Cutoff	to	Continue,”	United States 
House of Representatives,	December	13,	2011.	http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/news/story/?2126.	(accessed	
May	1,	2013).
25	 	Dan	Coats,	“Coats	Amendments	Protecting	Peace	Efforts	in	Middle	East,	Cutting	Aid	to	Pakistan	Pass	Appropriations	
Committee,”	United States Senator for Indiana Dan Coats,	May	24,	2012.	http://www.coats.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/
coats-amendments-protecting-peace-efforts-in-middle-east-cutting-aid-to-pakistan-pass-appropriations-committee	(Accessed		May	
1,	2013).
26	 	Robert	McMahon,	“Palestinian	Statehood	at	the	U.N.	Backgrounder,”	Council of Foreign Relations,	November	30,	2012,		
http://www.cfr.org/palestinian-authority/palestinian-statehood-un/p25954#p1	(accessed	May	12,	2013).
27	 	“Statements	by	Elected	Officials:	UN	General	Assembly	Grants	Palestine	Non-member	Observer	Status,”	Jewish Community 
Relations Council of New York,	November	30,	2012.
28	 	Luis	Blanchfield	and	Marjorie	A.	Brown,	“The United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),”	CRS	Report	R42999.	Washington,	DC:	Library	of	Congress,	Congressional	Research	Service,	
March	18,	2013:	15.
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seek out leverage from transnational NSAs. This would amplify UNESCO’s demands by opening “spaces for new 
issues and echo demands in the domestic arena of the state.”29
APPLYING THE RESOURCES AND TACTICS TO MAKE THE CASE FOR 
UNESCO IN THE U.S.
UNESCO’s Director-General’s advocacy through informational, symbolic, accountability, 
and leverage politics
The most visible display of UNESCO’s advocacy has been the planning of two official trips to the U.S. by 
UNESCO’s Director-General, Irina Bokova. Bokova has actively sought to communicate “why UNESCO matters 
to America and why America matters to UNESCO,” through op-eds, speeches, high-level visits and meetings, 
public events, and conferences held with the U.S. government and NSAs. This paper focuses on Bokova’s second 
trip because it focused on meetings with NSAs and illustrates their support for UNESCO.
Informational politics is the ability to generate politically usable information and move it to where it will have 
the most impact.30 UNESCO’s information politics was based on stressing the relevance of UNESCO to the U.S. 
In the days following the withholding of funds, Bokova addressed the situation in a public statement. Bokova’s 
statement showed that UNESCO needed to appeal to the U.S. Congress, highlighting that the agency’s key 
education, communication, and science projects were advancing U.S. interests, particularly in the Middle East.31
Credibility and drama seem to be essential components of a strategy aimed at persuading publics and 
policymakers to change their minds.32 In a similar vein, the messages delivered at several public events stressed 
the relationship between female education and security in Afghanistan to fight extremism.33 Some of the messages 
could be considered “accountability politics” since their intention was to “hold powerful actors to their previously 
stated policies or principles.”34 Bokova has insisted that UNESCO and the U.S. share the same priorities and 
values in working toward building free and open societies. 
By arguing that the U.S. values are embedded in UNESCO’s mission, and that the lack of U.S. engagement 
with the organization implies a renouncing of global leadership, UNESCO is making use of accountability politics 
to keep the U.S. engaged.
Symbolic politics
As a member of UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention since 1972, the U.S. is able to add its cultural and natural 
heritage sites to the World Heritage List. On March 19, 2012, Bokova stopped in Philadelphia to celebrate the 
40th anniversary of the World Heritage Convention. The venue for the celebration was the first U.S. monument 
added to the World Heritage List, Independence Hall. This location, and other World Heritage activities during 
the celebration, were suitable for enacting the power of “symbolic politics.” Symbolic politics refers to the process 
of persuasion of framing issues by “identifying and providing convincing explanations for powerful symbolic 
events.”35
In her remarks for the celebration, Bokova linked the significance of Independence Hall with the values of the 
UNESCO mandate.36 Likewise, the head of UNESCO made a visit to the Everglades National Park, a site listed 
as in danger; her visit was a strong reminder for the need to preserve the site.37 She recalled that the concept 
29	 	Keck	and	Sikkink,	Activists beyond Borders, 13.
30	 	Ibid.,	19.
31	 	Irina	Bokova,	“Statement by the Director-General of UNESCO on Withholding of Funds by the United States.”  UNESCO.org, 
November	2,	2011,  http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/statement_by_the_director_general_of_
unesco_on_withholding_of_funds_by_the_united_states	(accessed	May	1,	2013).
32	 	Keck	and	Sikkink,	Activists beyond Borders, 19.
33	 	Irina	Bokova,	“Address by Irina Bokova, Director-General of UNESCO” (address, Women and Global Development Forum 
Chicago Council on Global Affairs,	Chicago,	IL,	March	16,	2012).	
34	 	Keck	and	Sikkink,	Activists Beyond Borders, 24.
35	 	Keck	and	Sikkink,	Activists Beyond Borders,	22.
36	 		Irina	Bokova,	“Address by Irina Bokova, Director-General of UNESCO on the occasion of the 49th Anniversary of the World 
Heritage Convention” (address, 40th Anniversary of the World Heritage Convention,	2012).
37	 	UNESCO,	“World	Heritage	and	Sustainable	Tourism	Agenda	in	Miami	Leg	of	Director-General’s	Mission	to	the	U.S.,”	
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of World Heritage was born in the U.S. from the inspiration of the National Park Service’s system and from the 
contribution of Russell Train, one of the authors of the World Heritage Convention’s text.38
By remembering the U.S. involvement in the World Heritage Convention Foundation and stressing how 
the convention functions as “a channel to share its conservation ideals around the world,”39 UNESCO aimed 
at conveying a powerful and clear message to appeal to the shared principles between American foundational 
values and UNESCO’s mandate.  
Leverage politics: The role of think tanks and foundations
As argued by Keck and Sikkink, in order to bring about policy change, networks need to pressure and persuade 
more powerful actors to gain influence “far beyond the network’s ability to influence state practices directly.”40 
UNESCO used leveraged politics when it took its message to the platforms provided by think tanks and when it 
leveraged the resources of U.S. foundations. As argued by Katz, think tanks have become influential actors in the 
making of American domestic and foreign policy because of their ability to disseminate messages and impact 
public opinion.41 Furthermore, as argued by Freund, some foundations have become bold in exercising power 
through overt political lobbying.42 Such characteristics were useful for UNESCO to disseminate its core message 
through the think tank round tables, policy briefs, and backgrounds. 
The U.N. Foundation and the Better World Campaign
The relationship between UNESCO and the Better World Campaign (BWC), an American advocacy nonprofit 
organization, is important because of BWC’s lobbying expertise. In March 2012, BWC provided congressional 
testimony in support of UNESCO funding and requested congressional support for a presidential waiver on 
the law.43 As Keck and Sikkink argue, some kinds of pressure and agenda politics that advocacy networks use 
rarely involve mass mobilization. In the case of the BWC, one of the factors that curtail its ability to call upon 
mass mobilization is the limited financial resources to run high-profile public campaigns. However, the BWC has 
focused its activities on educating members of Congress and the media about UNESCO’s initiatives in key areas 
of American interests, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, gender equality, press freedom, and to some extent, world 
heritage. The BWC briefings and meetings on Capitol Hill, along with the publication of public opinion polls, are 
informational politics.44
ISSUE AND ACTOR CHARACTERISTICS
Issue characteristics and actor characteristics are important factors that explain how networks affect political 
outcomes.45 Regarding issue characteristics, Keck and Sikkink focus on “issue resonance.” They argue that 
some issues can be framed more easily than others to resonate with policymakers and publics. Likewise, the 
characteristics of both the activist network and its target are assessed based on “network density” and “target vulnerability.”
March	20,	201,		http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/resources/online-materials/single-view/news/world_heritage_and_
sustainable_tourism_top_agenda_in_miami_leg_of_director_generals_mission_to_the_us/	(accessed	May	1,	2013).
38	 	Ibid.
39	 	Ibid.
40	 	Keck	and	Sikkink,	Activists Beyond Borders, 23.
41	 	Michael	Katz,	“American	Think	Tanks,”		Carnegie Reporter 5,	no.	2	(2009),	http://carnegie.org/publications/carnegie-
reporter/single/view/article/item/213/	(accessed	May	1,	2013).
42	 	Gerald	Freund, Narcissism and Philanthropy, Ideas and Talented Denied,	(New	York:	Viking,	1996).
43	 	Peter	Yeo,	“Better	World	Campaign’s	Peter	Yeo	Testifies	Before	Congress	Amid	Possible	Funding	Cuts	to	UN	and	
Peacekeeping,”	March	14,	2013,	http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/news-room/press-releases/executive-director-peter-yeo.html	
(accessed	May	1,	2013).	
44	 	Better	World	Campaign,	“Americans’	Global	Priorities	for	Obama	Second	Term:	Support	for	UN	is	in	Our	Best	Interest,”	Last	
modified	January	16,	2013,	http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/news-room/press-releases/january-2013-polling-results.html.
45	 	Keck	and	Sikkink,	Activists Beyond Borders, 26.
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Issue resonance
One of the biggest challenges for UNESCO is the lack of familiarity among the U.S. public about the organiza-
tion. Despite the lack of criticism of UNESCO as an institution or toward its programs,46 there is also very little 
knowledge about what the organization does. As Yeo argued, “It is not an issue that breaks through the American 
public.” The lack of knowledge about UNESCO’s mission and governance negatively affects the public percep-
tion toward the organization and can exacerbate past misperceptions of being a pro-Palestinian organization. 
Another problem that impedes issue resonance is the low profile of its lobbying activities. The efforts undertaken 
by the BWC have been in a careful and quiet fashion because of fear of backlash from powerful lobbies that are 
against legislation to waive restrictions on paying the U.S. contributions.47 
Network density 
“Networks best operate when they are dense, with many actors, strong connections and reliable information 
flows.”48 However, some of the links within UNESCO’s network in the U.S. are not as dense and well connected 
to generate strong support for UNESCO’s case. This is particularly noticeable in the network of UNESCO clubs, 
centers, and associations based in the U.S. UNESCO clubs, centers, and associations constitute part of the orga-
nization’s grassroots base. They are set up in schools and universities and are considered a “genuine movement 
of influence” because of their role to disseminate UNESCO values and mobilize public opinion.49 However, as of 
February 2012, only seven clubs, centers, and associations were registered in the U.S.50 Although work is being 
done to expand the number of members, insufficient resources and a lack of qualified people to promote UN-
ESCO appear to be hampering the development of a grassroots base.51 The lack of a well-developed network 
of UNESCO clubs represents a serious challenge for the organization. These clubs serve as awareness-raising 
agents that allow access to the “young people and public opinion often ill-informed of UNESCO’s programs, its 
goals, its works or even difficulties.”52  
Effective networks must involve reciprocal information exchanges.53 It appears that there is a lack of 
involvement between NSAs and the U.S. National Commission to UNESCO. As noted by a club, “respected 
voices of American science, education and culture have been largely silent in the formulation of U.S. policy 
toward UNESCO and largely absent from delegations to meetings of UNESCO’s governing bodies.”54 This is 
a particular challenge for UNESCO as the national commissions function as “guarantors of the organization’s 
visibility in the field.”55 These commissions are supposed to be best placed “to inform both public opinion and 
current or potential partners about UNESCO’s missions and goals.”56
Target vulnerability
As argued by Keck and Sikkink, “Target actors must be vulnerable either to material incentives or to sanctions 
from outside actors.”57 The material incentives to persuade Congress to restore funding stem from the level of 
46	 	Yeo,	“Better	World.”
47	 	Newsteam	Staff,	“Tracking	the	Issues:	A	Waiver	for	UNESCO	Funding	Ban,”	Council on Foreign Relations,	February	17,	2012,	
http://blogs.cfr.org/campaign-2012/2012/02/17/tracking-the-issues-a-waiver-for-unesco-funding-ban/	(accessed	September	22,	
2013).
48	 	Keck	and	Sikkink,	Activists Beyond Borders,	28.
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relevance of UNESCO’s projects to U.S. interests and how much funding these projects are worth. The sensitivity 
of Congress has been curtailed because UNESCO is not considered urgent to fund. It has been argued that, 
because UNESCO is considered a cultural organization, it is difficult to justify funding to culture or education 
overseas, even if the organization’s projects help American interests.58 Additionally, UNESCO’s activities are 
not seen as high-profile operations as much as other U.N. operations, such as humanitarian relief work or 
peacekeeping operations.59 The lack of consideration toward UNESCO activities may also be a reflection of a 
generalized less respect among the developed nations to the U.N. agency, because the benefits of UNESCO 
programs have been mostly received by developing countries;  wealthy countries can usually afford to care for 
their own great monuments.60
CONCLUSION
This paper aimed to explore if UNESCO could use the boomerang pattern that characterizes TANs’ influence on 
U.S. domestic politics. In doing so, the paper served to explore possible avenues that IGOs can follow to engage 
nonstate actors to influence the majority of member states’ preferences. As argued by Keck and Sikkink, the 
effectiveness of TANs to affect political outcomes is contingent on conditions regarding institutional structures, 
the activists’ tactics to persuade the target, the characteristics of the issue, the activist network, and the target’s 
vulnerability.
Since the embedded political and legal conditions of the UNESCO-U.S. impasse obstruct UNESCO from 
obtaining U.S. funding restoration, the boomerang pattern has the potential to be relevant and effective. 
However, the issue’s characteristics, coupled with UNESCO’s network in the U.S. and Congress’ vulnerability to 
be persuaded for fund restoration, impose constraints against an effective activation of transnational advocacy 
support.
Some of the literature about transnational mobilization points out that the effectiveness of transnational 
networks depends on their grounding in domestic societies.61 Risse argues the most important effect of 
transnational mobilization against a determined government is “not so much to change the behavior of the 
government but to facilitate social mobilization in the domestic arena.”62 In this regard, even if UNESCO has the 
institutional structures embodied in the U.S. National Commission and UNESCO clubs, centers, and associations 
in the U.S., they are constrained because some of the links that connect their networks are not dense or well 
connected enough to be leveraged. These conditions undermine the social mobilization that could influence the 
state’s domestic policies. 
The resonance of UNESCO’s defunding is restricted by the lack of familiarity with UNESCO among the U.S. 
public and the misperceptions that emerge from this lack of knowledge. This lack of UNESCO awareness impacts 
the effectiveness of lobbying efforts. As argued by the BWC, lobbying efforts are always strengthened when there 
is public pressure. Part of the reason why UNESCO’s defunding does not resonate is also explained by the low 
profile of its lobbying activities. Since UNESCO’s advocates are dealing with an issue that is highly sensitive, they 
opt to conduct the case in a low-profile manner to prevent backlash from interest groups opposed to Palestine’s 
strategy to gain recognition through the U.N. system. Furthermore, since lobbying practices require specialized 
knowledge of U.S. politics, U.S. NSAs prefer not approaching global partners because of a lack of familiarity 
with U.S. politics. Such factors are severely diminishing the resonance of the UNESCO defunding issue in the U.S.
Congress does not heed demands for restoration of funding for UNESCO because UNESCO’s activities are 
not considered urgent. Their projects are lacking the necessary material incentives to leverage Congress’ interest. 
It appears that the moral leverages that can be used on countries that aspire to belong to a normative community 
58	 	Yeo,	“Better	World.”
59	 		Colum	Lynch,	“Will	Congress’s	defunding	of	the	U.N.	over	Palestine	hurt	U.S.	goals	around	the	world?”	Foreign Policy Blog, 
October	25,	2011,	http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/25/will_congress_s_defunding_of_the_un_over_palestine_
hurt_us_goals_around_the_world	(accessed	May	1,	2013).
60	 	Saragossa	Dutt,	“The	role	of	intellectuals	and	non-governmental	organizations	in	Britain’s	relations	with	UNESCO,”	The 
Round Table The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs	88,	no.	350,	(1999):	207–228.
61	 	Risse,	The Power of Norms, 180.	
62	 	Ibid.
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of nations are not stronger than the broad conviction among lawmakers that not funding UNESCO is serving as 
a “credible threat” to deter Palestine. Furthermore, the strong bipartisan support for Israel plays a major factor 
that deters Congress’ support for funding restoration.   
Finally, this case study sheds light on the public diplomacy challenges for UNESCO. Public diplomacy, 
understood as an international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through engagement 
with a foreign public,63 can be a means for UNESCO to tackle two important challenges: the lack of public 
awareness about the organization and the negative perceptions from publics and elites. As argued before, these 
two factors result in a weak resonance of UNESCO’s defunding that impedes a strong social mobilization in the 
domestic arena. The implementation of public diplomacy strategies to engage with NSAs and build long-term 
relationships seems necessary to create an environment conducive to strengthening the relationship between 
UNESCO and the U.S. 
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